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This paper has two objectives.  First, we identify a problem with the ability of the discrete-continuous
choice (DCC) framework and conditional demand functions to fully describe consumer preferences
in the presence of kinked budget constraints.  Second, we propose and illustrate an alternative, preference
based, method for estimating consumer responses to price changes under these conditions.  Our preference
based approach yields price elasticities on the order of 0.4 and a "utilities expenditure" elasticity of
near unity.  This research highlights the possibility that households may be more sensitive to price
schedules than previously thought. It is recognizes commitments to commodities such as pools or outdoor
landscaping  influence how water consumption  responds to price changes as part of the long run adjustments.
Aaron Strong
University of Calgary













This paper has two objectives.  First, we identify a general problem in using the 
discrete-continuous choice (DCC) framework and conditional demand functions for 
applied welfare analysis with changes in kinked budget constraints.  To illustrate the 
relevance of our argument, we consider the estimation issues that arise for the case of 
models for residential water demand with increasing block rate structures.  Second, we 
propose an alternative, preference based, method for estimating consumer responses 
under these conditions.  By specifying a direct utility function and estimating its 
parameters, our approach can evaluate policies that alter all the attributes of a block 
pricing structure.  For the case of residential water demand, in many areas of the United 
States, especially in the arid Southwest, this type of change is being discussed as a 
component of increased incentives for conservation.
1  At a national level, it is also part of 
EPA’s policy known as the “Four Pillars of Sustainable Infrastructure.”
2 
Conventional models for commodity demand (or labor supply) in the presence of 
a piece-wise linear budget constraints use a parametric specification for the conditional 
demand (labor supply) function to describe the selection of a “best facet” on the budget 
constraint and with it, an amount of the commodity demanded (or labor supplied).  The 
choice is decomposed into the discrete and continuous components.  This strategy has 
been widely adopted in describing labor supply responses including differences in 
participation status (i.e. working, retired, etc), and the extent of participation, part time 
                                                 
1 In June 2007, U.S. News and World Reports profiled the global water problem.  There continues to be 
professional and popular assessments raising concern about water management and availability (i.e. The 
Economist, December 8, 2007 and National Geographic, February, 2008) as well as renewed interest in 
economic research see Olmstead et al. [2007], Mansur and Olmstead [2006] and Chen and Hanak [2007]. 
2 The EPA Assistant Administrator for Water, Benjamin Grumbles in a 2006 briefing on EPA’s water 
policies that current water prices signal it is available and cheap.  This statement has been echoed in most 
of the popular assessments.  
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vs. full time.  It has also been an important component modeling of the strategies used to 
consistently estimate electricity and water demands in the presence of block rate pricing 
structures.   
By contrast, our proposed method uses a different maintained assumption.  It 
specifies household preferences using a direct utility function.  As a result, there are also 
assumptions that underlie the model’s results.  One of the important questions arises from 
identification.  That is, given a preference specification, a key issue concerns whether we 
can identify and estimate the structural parameters using the first order conditions from 
the constrained choice problem. The limited price variation usually encountered in 
applying the model to households in a single region can confound the ability to observe 
quantity adjustments.     
We illustrate the logic for our method with an application to the residential water 
demand for the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area.  Our empirical model uses monthly 
consumption data for 2005 for the “average” household (in a single family dwelling) in 
the service areas of each of 43 water service providers in the Phoenix Active 
Management Area (PAMA) of Arizona.  By intersecting the GIS descriptions of the 
water providers’ service areas with the GIS records for 2000 Census at the block group 
level and the Maricopa County (the county within PAMA) parcel records, we construct a 
set of economic, residential property, and demographic variables to serve as instruments.  
We compare our results for the preference model with the conventional DCC framework 
applied to the same sample and find the later yields insignificant income coefficients and 
smaller (in absolute magnitude) conditional price elasticity estimates.    
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Section two describes the main elements of our argument.  It begins by describing 
the DCC framework.  After that, we explain one of the issues motivating this paper –an 
apparent contradiction between the Hausman [1979] interpretation of what is possible 
within the DCC framework and the Bockstael-McConnell [1981] conclusion about the 
difficulties facing welfare measurement with nonlinear budget constraints. With that 
background, we then summarize how Reiss and White [2006] explain the appropriate 
strategy for welfare measurement with nonlinear budget constraints.
3  Within that 
context, we describe the problems with using the DCC logic to evaluate large changes in 
a block pricing structure for resources whose demands are largely determined by the 
utilization of complementary goods.  Section three outlines the estimation strategy. 
Section four describes the data sources and five presents our results.  The last section 
comments on the potential role measures of the responsiveness of water demand to major 




II.  Background and Economic Consistency 
A. Context 
Water demand is one of the prominent applications for models explaining 
consumer choice in the presence of kinked budget constraints. The Hewitt and Hanemann 
[1995] paper is the first, and arguably the most comprehensive, application of the DCC 
framework to water demand.  Their analysis follows the general recommendations of 
                                                 
3 To our knowledge, none of the water demand models have attempted to measure the consumer surplus 
associated with price changes.  Most of their focus has been correctly measuring unconditional price 
elasticities in the presence of kinked budget constraints. 
4 For example see Hanak and Chen [2007].  
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Hausman [1979] and Moffit [1986] for these situations. A conditional demand is 
specified. In their case, it is a constant elasticity function. The price and virtual income 
for the conditional demand are defined by the first stage selection of an optimal budget 
segment given the block pricing structure. Two errors are included in the specification.  
One represents optimization error and the second captures unobserved heterogeneity. 
Given assumed distributions for these errors (usually independent normality), observed 
water use, and knowledge of the specific features of the pricing structure faced by 
households, the framework defines the likelihood function for a sample of households’ 
water consumption. Variation in the pricing structures, the maintained distributions for 
the errors, and the parametric specification for conditional demand function allows 
statistically consistent estimates to be developed.   
The DCC model characterizes consumer preferences with the specification of a 
conditional demand function.  The same functional form and parameterization is used to 
describe all of the segments of an increasing block rate structure.  This restriction assures 
that the parameters can be identified.  To illustrate our argument here, we selected the 
simplest of the popular specifications, a linear conditional demand given in equation 
(2.1): 
  ii i wZ p m γ αδ = ++ (2.1) 
Water is assumed to be priced with an increasing block rate structure with the 
nonlinear price for water defined as  () cwand the form of the relationship given in 
equation (2.2). Assuming a two block pricing structure,   p corresponds to the higher 
marginal price (the second block) and  p  the initial block’s marginal price.  w ˆ  is the  
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threshold for the change in the marginal price (the amount of water defining kink point 
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Z is a vector of socio-demographic and household specific attributes,  i p  is the 
marginal price of the ith block and  i m  is the virtual income of the ith block.   2 m , the 
virtual income of the second block, is defined by equation (2.3): 
  w ) p - p ( + m = m2 ˆ  (2.3) 
Following Hausman [1979], the quasi indirect utility function implied by this 
conditional demand specification is derived by Roy’s identity.  The first step links the 
specified conditional Marshallian demand from equation (2.1) to the relationship implied 
by Roy’s identity in equation (2.4).  This sequence describes how the differential 
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 (2.5) 
As a rule, initial conditions help to relate c to the other factors that may influence 
the quantity demanded and also serve to provide the utility index. For our purposes,  
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without loss of generality, we can write the expression for of the indirect utility function 
implied by this demand using equation (2.6)
5: 
  2 (,)
p Z
Vp m e m p
δ α αγ
δ δδ
− ⎛⎞ =+ + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 (2.6) 
A part of Hausman’s argument for the model noted that the log likelihood 
function can be defined from the conditional demand functions. Thus, it is possible to 
recover parameter estimates for (2.6) using the conditional demand given in equation 
(2.1). It relies on the restriction of a common conditional demand specification for all 
facets of the budget constraint. Moreover, it restricts the demand parameters to be equal 
across all blocks.  The estimator resembles one for interval censored data, adjusted to 
reflect the effect of block choice on the implied virtual income (i.e. actual income 
adjusted by the difference between what would be implied if all units consumed were 
priced at the marginal price implied by the selected price block and what each household 
actually pays as we have described in equation (2.3)).  What is important about this logic 
is that it would appear that the estimated parameters of the conditional demand function 
contain sufficient information for welfare measurement when they are used in the scheme 
outlined by Reiss and White.  However, this suggestion overlooks the importance of the 
assumption that conditional demand functions “look just like” unconditional demand 
functions aside from the adjustment to the income term.  We can investigate the 
importance by examining the Reiss-White proposal in more detail. 
 
B.  Welfare Analysis with the DCC Model 
                                                 
5 The direct utility function implied by equation is: 
2
2 ( , ) exp exp exp
xw
Uwx w Z
δ αδ α α
δγ
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A key conclusion of the earlier work discussing problems with applied welfare 
analysis in the presence of nonlinear budget constraints is that with a nonlinear budget 
constraint, the Marshallian “prices as parameters” demand function (or labor supply 
function) does not exist!  Bockstael and McConnell [1983] made this point in discussing 
the implications of the household production function (HPF) framework for applied 
welfare analysis. Reiss and White’s [2006] might seem to have proposed a resolution to 
the problem.  However, their derivation of welfare measures with nonlinear prices relies 
on the ability to assume the existence of what appears to be an ordinary Marshallian 
demand function that can be integrated back to quasi-expenditure function.  The resulting 
compensated demand is then used with the marginal price function to develop the welfare 
measures.  This marginal price function helps in describing the path of price change.  
Reconciling the two disparate arguments requires understanding the role for the 
assumed properties of the “Marshallian” demands defined for each value of the marginal 
price. Marginal prices can be continuous in the household production case considered by 
Bockstael and McConnell or they can change discretely for the kinked budget constraint 
due to block rate pricing.  It is this relationship that is giving rise to the nonlinearity in the 
budget constraint.
6  As Bockstael and McConnell demonstrate in note #1 (p. 810) with a 
general nonlinear budget constraint, the features of preferences and nature of the 
constraint are scrambled.  In their example, each of the marginal cost functions will imply 
a different slope for the Marshallian demand function.  Reiss and White’s argument 
requires that there exists a single Marshallian demand that describes how quantity 
                                                 
6 It also influences the relationship between the sum of the quasi expenditure function and the infra 
marginal expenditure adjustment to derive the unobserved arguments needed for the Hicksian welfare 
measure in the Reiss and White [2006] framework.  See 10-11 for their discussion.  
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demand changes for each marginal price.
7  This is essentially the same as what is being 
assumed in the DCC framework. We must assume preferences are consistent with an 
identical conditional demand for all price facets of the kinked budget constraint. 
This requirement stands in contrast with conclusions from the literature on the 
econometrics of kinked budget constraints that appear much more general in their scope.  
For example, Hausman [1979] has argued that demand (or supply) functions can be 
estimated without instrumental variables or a weighted average of prices.  Roy’s identity, 
together with the convexity of the budget set, assure that the choice of segment and the 
quantity demanded can be based solely on the “demand functions.”
8   
The DCC framework describes the unconditional demand in a two step 
framework.  A conditional demand function is used to describe both the choice of the 
“best” price segment on the kinked budget constraint as well as the quantity demanded, 
given the marginal price and virtual income implied by the first selection.  The 
framework uses the logic implied by analytical (or numerical) solution to the differential 
equation defined by Roy’s identity to compute the correct response in quantity demanded 
to a movement along one segment of the faceted budget constraint.  However, as Reiss 
and White make clear, this result requires the assumption that a common (across facets) 
                                                 
7 Following Edelfsen [1981] it is possible to define a relationship (correspondence) between the marginal 
price/cost implied by the nonlinear constraint for each value of this partial derivative and in principle 
numerically implements the Reiss-White logic.  At each of the steps of the process, define the Marshallian 
relationship for that marginal price, apply a Vartian approximation and solve the implied extension to Reiss 
and White’s two equation framework for a specific marginal price and utility level.  A comparable issue 
arises with hedonic models and the definition of “demand” functions for the characteristics of 
heterogeneous goods.  See Brown and Rosen [1982], Mendelsohn [1985] and Palmquist [2005] for 
discussion 
8 In the context of a labor supply framework, Hausman [1980] develops this conclusion directly citing his 
earlier result and concludes “… an econometric model of both labor force participation and labor supply 
can be based solely on a labor supply equation specification.  Neither the direct not indirect utility function 
is needed” (p.165)  This same argument has been applied to consumer demand models where decisions 
about budget segment and amount demanded parallel the choice of participation and extent of work in the 
labor supply literature.  
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Marshallian conditional demand exists and describes demand responses correctly for all 
the marginal prices.   
This logic has been applied in modeling water and electricity demands.  In these 
cases, the demand is also conditional to another set of choices that are usually assumed to 
be made prior to the utilization decisions giving rise to water (or, in a similar context, 
electricity) usage patterns.  As a rule, these cases involve equipment or durables 
associated with residence.  Once we acknowledge that large changes in water price 
structures would influence these types of decisions then we must consider whether the 
envelope condition associated with re-evaluating commitments contains sufficient 
information to derive the associated “long run” demand response.  In general, we cannot 
be assured it will! 
To the extent the nature of the price schedule affects decisions to install pools or 
adopt different types of residential landscapes; those effects cannot be detected with the 
estimates derived from the DCC framework.   The DCC logic assumes the responses to 
changes in the implied marginal price along with the infra-marginal expenditure 
adjustment is all that is needed to “predict” the optimal facet for water (or electricity).  
One realization of this assumption arises with the model requiring that the form of the 
conditional demand function and the values for its unknown parameters are constant 
across all facets of the budget constraint. 
When we wish to re-design the price schedule in a general setting that assumes 
commitments to complementary goods might change, we do not have enough information 
to compute the marginal price and expenditure adjustments.  These effects are important 
because it is often the case that policy makers are selecting higher priced blocks to  
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discourage investments in high consumption complementary goods and therefore, the 
associated higher water consumption.   
 
 
  Reiss and White [2006] demonstrate that exact welfare measures can be 
derived in nonlinear pricing situations.  They propose a four step logic: 
(a) estimate ordinary demand functions relating quantity to the 
relevant marginal prices at the observe levels of the quantity demanded;
9 
(b) use these demand functions from (a) to recover the quasi-
expenditure function analytically (Hausman [1981]) or numerically 
(Vartia [1983]) and derive the corresponding Hicksian demand; (as our 
example illustrated) 
(c) at the observed quantity demanded, this expression for the 
Hicksian demand evaluated at an unknown constant marginal price and 
utility level should equal the inverse of the marginal price schedule also 
evaluated at this price; and finally, 
(d) the initial level of utility realized at the initial nonlinear price 
schedule should be consistent with the total expenditures implied by the 
price schedule and the virtual income (i.e. Hicksian expenditures 
                                                 
9 This first step is the practical constraint that avoids the numerical approach proposed by Edelfsen and 
described in footnote 3.  To begin the process, the analyst must have an estimate of the Marshallian demand 
function.  Without locally constant prices and the assumption of constant parameters across all price 
segments, we do not have the requisite demand function Reiss and White assume as a starting point.  
  12
evaluated at the initial marginal price and utility plus the income 
adjustment defined earlier).
10 
The equations defined by steps (c) and (d) provide two relationships and two 
unknowns – the initial marginal price consistent with the utility level realized and the 
level for the initial utility.  
With these two variables, they demonstrate compensated demand defined in terms 
of an artificial constant marginal price can be used.  A price schedule change is then 
recovered with the initial price and utility as well as the new price.  Exact welfare is the 
integral under the compensated demand between the two marginal prices corrected by the 
change in the adjustment to income. 
Reiss and White observe a big advantage of their logic is that: 
“… a researcher can begin an empirically satisfactory model for 
the ordinary demand function … and then compute exact consumer 
surplus under nonlinear prices without having to recover the direct utility 
function.” (Reiss and White [2006] p. 12) 
 
The problem with this logic is that it ignores the effects of changes in these 
conditional demands when the modifications in the price schedule are large enough to 
adjust quasi fixed goods, as we illustrate in the next section. 
 
C. Complementary  Goods 
Suppose that Z in equation (2.4) is a measure of the swimming pool or landscape 
structure that a household has committed to.  It is reasonable to assume there are 
complementarities between either of these “goods” and water demand.  The compensated 
demand response implied by equation (2.5) will consistently describe household 
                                                 
10 This process is consistent with Epstein’s [1981] discussion of consistent application of duality with 
nonlinear constraints.  See his Theorem 5 and the example of household production functions.  
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responses to changes in the marginal price only if the amount of Z is consistent with 









=  (2.7) 
with  Z V and  m V the partial derivatives of equation (2.6).  Using the quasi indirect utility 
function (equation (2.6)) this envelop condition means  Z p γ δ = . Substituting we can 








αδ −= =+ +  (2.8) 
Suppose, however, the virtual price and market price cannot be assumed to be 
equal.  In this case, the conditional demand specification for water is not enough 
information to describe how water demand would adjust in the long run as there are 
opportunities to modify these quasi-fixed commitments.  We need some basis for 
describing how Z would adjust to changes in p and  Z p .
11  That is, to recover the full 
adjustment to changes in p through the conditional demand, we are implicitly assuming 
the response implied by the envelop condition fully characterizes Z’s adjustment.  
Solving Roy’s identity uses changes in the water demand and p as well as initial 
conditions.  It tells us nothing about how Z would adjust to non-local changes in p.  
                                                 
11 This is not a new point.  Hausman [1981] noted that we only learn about variations in the own price of 
the good with the solution of the differential equation implied by Roy’s identity.  As La France and 
Hanemann [1989] and von Haefen [2003] document, we need additional assumptions and a line integral for 
more price changes.  
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To illustrate, suppose we assumed the demand for Z was also linear and adjusted 
in the “long run.”
12  Yet the demand given in equation (2.1) is a short run demand for 
water.  Assume equation (2.9) describes the long run demand for Z.  Using the envelop 
condition (2.7) and (2.9) we can illustrate why the Reiss-White procedure will not reflect 
the complementarities between w and Z.   
  Z Z ab mc p d p = ++ −  (2.9) 
Substituting into equation (2.8) for Z and rearranging terms, we have (2.10) 






dp p bp m ap c p
Vd p
αδ δ δ δ −= =− + − + +  (2.10) 
This result illustrates how the long run demand for w would imply that the 
marginal effect of p on water demand depends on  Z p (i.e. the first term in equation 
(2.10)).   
We could, as sometimes proposed with another situation involving a nonlinear 
budget constraint, assume that the nonlinearity of the conditional demand is sufficient to 
identify a role for Z’s adjustment.
13  However, what is estimated will be conditional to the 
relationship between Z and  Z p  in the envelop condition. 
The DCC model decomposes water demand into two steps, the choice of a best 
segment and then, conditional on that selection, a demand response to changes in that 
segment’s marginal price, given the adjustment to income required by the increasing 
block rate structure.  In principle, goods that are complements for water such as 
                                                 
12 Chetty and Szeidl [2007] used this argument in a dynamic setting to explain discrepancies between some 
types of behavior and measures of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  Assuming two classes of goods, 
food and committed consumption, they demonstrate that the income elasticity of food consumption is 
larger, implying greater food consumption response to income shocks with commitments than would be 
present without them. 
13 This was Brown and Rosen’s [1982] argument.  See Palmquist [2005] for further explanation and 
Chattopadyay [1999] for an example.  
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swimming pools or landscape systems have demands that depend on the full price 
schedule for the water that is utilized with them.  Once these commitments are made, 
they are quasi-fixed goods that influence the parameters of the Marshallian demand for 
water, as our simple example illustrates.  Large changes in the price schedule are likely to 
change these commitments.  They cannot be identified from the short run responses in the 
water usage alone. We illustrated this point in very simple terms by using the envelop 
condition together with an assumed demand function for one complementary good. The 
bottom line is we don’t escape making additional assumptions. The single conditional 
demand function is not sufficient.  
Arrufat and Zabalza [1986] identify a related issue in describing advantages of 
their use of a CES direct utility function to describe labor supply choices.  They note that: 
“… there are two reasons why, even when dealing with convex 
budget sets, it may be convenient to estimate a specific utility index.  
First, we may want to use our estimates to predict the effects of 
introducing non-convexities in the budget constraint …  unless we have at 
our disposal an explicit utility index, in either direct or indirect form, we 
will not be able to predict behavioral responses to these types of changes 
in the opportunity set.  Second, and less obvious, if there exist 
optimization errors …  the conventional measures of welfare change 
cannot be inferred from areas under market supply curves (even if 
compensated), since neither initial nor final positions will correspond to 
tangency positions.”  (p.48, emphasis added) 
 
 This discussion recognizes that the estimates from the demand model approach 
do not permit analysis of large scale reform in pricing (or tax) structures.  
 
III. Model 
Our alternative model begins with a specification for the direct utility function.  
We believe that this strategy offers a more transparent basis for characterizing  
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relationships between water and the complementary goods that influence how water is 
used.  This approach relies on a composite of structural restrictions as well as the need to 
observe sufficient variation in the price schedules for water along with household 
conditions to identify and estimate the parameters of that preference function.  
As a practical matter, commodities such as water, electricity and other utilities are 
associated with a small fraction of budget.  Small price changes in any one of them are 
unlikely to induce large re-allocation of income among all goods.  This feature of demand 
can compound the difficulties in estimating household demand.  The effects of small 
price changes may primarily induce re-allocation of the expenditures on household 
utilities.  Recognizing this prospect for estimation of the preference parameters using data 
with limited variation in the price structures, we assume utilities enter preferences in a 
separable sub-function and treat their expenditures as a fraction of income that varies 
with income.  Our estimates for this share are based on the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CES) average for utilities (including water). In 2006, they identified thirteen 
different income classes (see BLS [2007]).
14 
The preference specification describing the choice of utilities corresponds to the 
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=+ + +  (3.1) 
                                                 
14 Our sample is composed of average consumption levels and there are no area specific measures of these 
expenditure shares at the level of census data.  To account for differences with income we use the census 
measures of household income for each water provider’s service area along with the CES to assign one of 
thirteen different values for the expenditure share ranging from about .068 to .108. 
15 This is based on Hanemann’s [1984] earlier proposed model for generalized corner solution model.  
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If we assume the expenditure on this component of a household’s budget is 
ms y = (with s equal to a value based on household income), then we can embed the 
budget constraint into the utility function.  As in equation (3.2): 
11
( ) exp( )(exp( ) ) ( ( ))
x
wx
Uw Z q w m cw
ω ρ ρ δε β θ
ρρ
=+ + + −    (3.2) 
  () mc w −  corresponds to a household’s virtual expenditures on the other 
components of utilities and will depend on  the block rate structure faced by each 
household (see Hewitt and Hanemann [1995] for a detailed discussion).  Z is a matrix of 
socio-demographic variables, q is matrix of water specific attributes such as lot size, and 
presence of a pool, θ is a demand shift parameter (e.g. similar to a threshold consumption 
in a Stone-Geary specification) that also contains the identification of summer vs. winter 
time span, and ρω and ρx are substitution parameters.
16  The complementary goods 
(treated as quasi-fixed commitments) enter the utility function as part of a scaling 
function.  This is consistent with the utilization logic described earlier. By specifying the 
direct utility function, we include the equivalent of the information that would be needed 
in the set of long run demands for complementary goods. The expression, exp( ) qw β θ + , 
can be considered as a quality adjusted, or quantity augmentation based on prior 
commitments, measure for the use of water.  The first of these interpretations is similar to 
that of von Haefen et al. [2004] in a recreation application. 
Further intuition for these parameters, can be offered by recognizing that this 
function is a variation on Mukerji’s [1963] constant ratio of elasticity of substitution 
function. The Hanemann-Von Haefen et al. function can be derived using a monotonic 
                                                 
16 These two parameters implicitly allow for complementary or substitute relationships between the 
quantity of water consumed and these other goods.  
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transformation of the Mukerji generalization of the CES function. This re-casting of the 
model allows Smith’s[1974] derivation of the price and income elasticities implied by 
this function to be used to describe local responsiveness within budget segments and thus 
to compare the estimates implied by the function with what has been derived using 
conditional demand functions within a DCC framework.
17 
The estimating equation for the model’s parameters uses the first order condition 
for the local optimization component of the household’s budget and is given in equation 
(3.3):  
11 exp( )exp( )(exp( ) ) '( )( ( )) 0
x Zq q w c w m c w
ω ρρ δε β β θ
−− ++ + − =    (3.3) 
It is able to include the implications of the kinked budget constraint by defining mi as the 
virtual available income for utilities in block i and pi the relevant marginal price.  The 
expression is conditional on the block selected. Water demand, price, and expenditures 
on remaining utilities (i.e. ii mp w − ) are all endogenous variables. Taking natural 
logarithms of (3) and re-arranging terms, yields equation (3.4). 
ln( ) ( 1)ln(exp( ) ) (1 )ln( ) iw x i i pZq q w m p w δ βρ β θ ρ ε =++− + + − − +  (3.4) 
ε can be assumed to correspond to either optimization error or unobserved household 
heterogeneity.   
Our analysis does not confront the issues associated with choice at the kinks of 
the budget constraint versus tangencies to a facet.  As we discuss below, the use of 
consumption for an “average” household implies that all choices can be interpreted as 
tangencies with optimization errors that are on average zero.  Our framework uses GIS 
                                                 
17 An analysis of the responses to changes in the full price schedule is also possible and would require 
simulating the constrained optimization for different price schedules.  This is outside the scope of this 
paper.  
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methods to intersect water service provider service areas with Census block areas for 
Maricopa County as well as with the parcel records for residential properties. These 
variables characterize water providers’ customers. They are used to define instruments 




  Ideally, our model (and the DCC specification) would be applied with 
household level data.  These data are generally not in the public domain.  When studies 
have had access to micro data they often span wide geographic domains with quite 
different patterns of water use or they have very limited price variation.  Olmstead et al. 
[2007] is an example of the first situation and Pint [1999], the second. 
We illustrate our model and compare it to the DCC framework using data that are 
consistently in the public domain.  These data are based on average household water 
usage for residential customers in each of a set of water providers.  We exploit the 
variation in price schedules and construct the bill that would have resulted for a 
household with this water usage for each provider.  Thus, our example considers a 
potentially important issue that is secondary to the main objective of the paper.  That is, 
we investigate whether differences in modeling assumptions between a preference based 
formulation and the DCC model can be detected with relatively “coarse” aggregate data.   
 
B. Data Sources 
The Phoenix Active Management Area is shown in Figure 1 and corresponds to 
approximately the northern two-thirds of Maricopa County. It encompasses all of what 
would be considered the Phoenix Metropolitan area.  The data for our application were 
collected from a variety of sources.  The 2005 price schedule for each water service 
provider is reported by the Arizona Water Infrastructure Financing Authority.  Table 1 
summarizes the features of these price schedules.  The first panel highlights the variation  
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in the price schedule across providers.  Each element in the table displays the range of 
marginal prices (per thousand gallons) for each block.  The second panel provides the 
average width of the blocks across the uniform, two, three and four block schedules. Each 
is measured in gallons. 
Information on aggregate single family consumption in 2005 and number of 
single family customers was obtained from imaged records of the Arizona Department of 
Water Resources’ Schedule F available for monthly water consumption by residence 
type.  These data allow construction of water used by an “average” single family 
residential consumer.   Based on that monthly water consumption and each provider’s 
price schedule we can recover measures for their marginal price and expenditures on 
water.  These two datasets provide 516 provider/month observations for water 
consumption and price schedule information. 
Census data for 2000 were adapted to conform to the service areas of each of the 
providers to construct measures of expenditures on utilities as well as other economic and 
demographic variables characterizing their customers.  This was accomplished by 
intersecting the Census block groups with the water service provider areas.
18 Average 
household income together with the CES schedule of the proportions of income spent on 
utilities by income class was used to construct the total expenditures on utilities for each 
area.  The parcel records from the Maricopa County Assessor were used to develop 
summary statistics for housing measures at the Census block group level and ultimately 
                                                 
18 The construction of the demographic information required intersecting the service provider areas with the 
census block groups.  Two statistics were defined:  (1) the percentage of each block group contained in the 
service provider area; and (2) the percentage of the service provider area contained in each of the block 
groups.  The first was used to aggregate census variables describing distributions (e.g. income, race, etc.) 
and the second for summary statistics such as means or medians 
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intersected with water service provider areas.  This allows measurement of the percentage 
of households with pools located in a given service provider area.  To control for climatic 
conditions monthly data on cooling degree days with a 65° baseline and total 
precipitation during the month were obtained from the National Climatic Data Center of 
NOAA for the Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport station.   
There are approximately 60 water service providers that serve the Phoenix 
Metropolitan area.  Of these, 43 have complete records for residential customers in single 
family dwellings.  The first panel of Table 2 provides some summary statistics for the 
demographic characteristics for the residential customers across providers.  The second 
panel in the table summarizes the variation in temperature and precipitation across the 
months in our sample.  The majority of the water service providers that we eliminated are 
simply irrigation districts that may provide water to a few households usually at a fixed 
cost. 
19   
As with most water studies such as Hewitt and Hanemann [1995] and Olmstead et 
al. [2007], we are exploiting structural restrictions inherent in our model as well as the 
variation across water service providers in price schedules, socio-demographic, and 
housing characteristics to identify the model’s parameters.  All of these water service 
providers are in the Phoenix metropolitan area. There is no variation in linked weather 
conditions across water service providers because they are derived from a single weather 
station.  Weather related variables vary with the month of consumption. 
 
 
                                                 
19 The only other reason a provider was deleted from consideration stemmed from the fact that they are not 
required to report monthly consumption.  The size of the water service provider’s service area determines 
these reporting requirements.  
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V. Results 
We present the estimates for the DCC model as well as our proposed alternative 
framework.  The findings for our model are presented first.  Our alternative framework 
does need to consider endogeneity of price, water consumption, and net income.  Two 
estimators are considered for our model.  The first develops instruments for the log of the 
average household’s expenditures on other utilities (taking account of the implications of 
the block pricing structure for the virtual income available) and the average water 
consumption by month using the predictions from first stage regression models that 
include temperature degree days, total monthly precipitation, the percentage of houses 
with pools, the average house value (as assessed by homeowners in the census), total 
number of lots in the service area, and number of rental units.  These GIS constructed 
variables compromise the instruments in the first estimator. A simple model with fixed 
effects for each water service providers together with the weather variables is the second.  
The first stage estimates for the first of these estimators are given in Table 3. 
The estimates for the preference model parameters using each of the two sets of 
instruments are given in Table 4. Both models specify the Z matrix as composed of a 
vector of ones (for an intercept), our temperature measure, and the number of customers 
the water service provider serves. q contains the percentage of pools in the service 
provider area; and θ contains a constant and dummy variables identifying whether the 
monthly consumption was during the summer and winter periods.
20  The shoulder period 
between summer and winter is the omitted category.  We estimate equation (3.4) using 
non-linear least squares with each set of instruments.  
                                                 
20 Summer is defined as June, July, August and September where as winter is defined as December, 
January, February and March.  
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The estimates based on the demographic, economic, and weather variable 
instruments yield more precise results for the model. With instruments based on the 
provider fixed effects we find the model attributes all the price variation to the provider 
effects.  This is important because differences in the price schedules along with the 
variation in the average household’s water consumption in each provider’s residential 
customer class provide the variation in marginal prices.  With provider fixed effects used 
to define instruments it appears that the variation in the price schedule is being captured 
completely by these variables.  As a result, it is not surprising that the parameter 
estimates are not significant.  A Hausman [1978] specification test decisively rejects the 
fixed effects specification (χ
2  = 115.83 with p-value = 0.00).
21 
To evaluate these estimates further, we computed the price and “utilities 
expenditures” elasticities at the sample mean for the price of water and for the virtual 
utilities expenditures. These results are given in panel A of Table 5.  Below each estimate 
we report the Z-statistic based on the asymptotic standard errors. In addition, we 
computed the elasticity for each month and water provider. A summary of these results is 
given in panel B –with the mean, median and the minimum and maximum values across 
the providers in the summer months. 
There are several caveats in interpreting these estimates.  These measures are not 
the estimates that would be implied with a change in the structure of the increasing block 
rate structure.  They apply to local changes.  Our approach recovers estimates of all the 
preference parameters that would be required to derive a response to a large change in the 
price structure.  Indeed, this is a key motivation for the model.  We report these local 
                                                 
21 We conducted this test with and without the intercept and the results in both cases favor the model using 
the GIS constructed instruments over that based on provider fixed effects.  
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price and expenditure elasticities because they are comparable to most of the literature 
and are more comparable to the elasticities implied by the conditional demands estimated 
with the DCC framework.
22  In our case, measures of the demand responses to large 
changes require computation of the solutions to the constrained optimization problems 
associated with a baseline price structure and the proposed change. 
Our estimates are also conditioned by the maintained separability assumption we 
discussed at the outset.  This restriction influences how the estimates can be compared 
with findings from the existing literature.  For the income elasticity, the relationship is 
straightforward, provided we interpret the response to an income change as a marginal 
change to a pre-existing optimal water consumption choice.  wy ws sy σ σσ = , with  wy σ  the 
conventional income elasticity of demand;  ws σ  the utilities expenditure elasticity (i.e. 
what we estimated); and  sy σ  the elasticity of the composite of utilities expenditures with 
respect to household income. Using estimates for  sy σ from the literature, we can adapt the 
results in Table 4 to develop a measure of the income elasticity implied by our findings. 
For example, Blanciforti and Green [1983] report an estimate of  sy σ =0.62.
23  This 
implies our estimate for the income elasticity of demand for water using the measures for 
ws σ  of 0.63 (i.e. 0.62 * 1.02) 
The price elasticities also require some adjustment  ( wp wp ws mp σ ησ σ = − ) where 
wp η  is our estimate for the price elasticity, holding the utilities expenditures constant and 
                                                 
22 In their appendix, Olmstead et al. document the simulation methods used to develop measures for 
elasticities for the unconditional demand. 
23 More recently Taylor [2005] has estimated income elasticities using the consumer expenditure survey.  
His results range from 0.31-0.42 for 1999 cross specifications for a category he designates as utilities.  
Water is not separately identified in the ACCRA price indexes he uses with the expenditure survey.  Water 
expenditure are included in the consumer expenditure survey.  So strictly speaking his price index fails to 
reflect the covariation in their prices  
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mp σ  is the elasticity of these expenditures with respect to the price of water, holding 
income constant. Since we are expressing the price elasticities as in absolute magnitudes 
these expressions imply the comparable “unconditional” price elasticity would be smaller 
than our estimates.
24   
As noted at the outset, we estimated the DCC model using a constant elasticity 
specification of the conditional demand function to compare our results.  We follow 
Hewitt and Hanemann [1995], Waldman [2000] and Olmstead et al. [2007] in our 
structuring of the model.  Table 6 shows two sets of parameter estimates for DCC model 
–using the expenditure on utilities as the income measure in the first column and average 
income in the second.  Several aspects of the results should be noted.  First, applications 
of the DCC model to date have used micro data.  Our findings that the variance of the 
optimization error is larger than the unobserved heterogeneity ( η ε σ σ > ), are likely due to 
the structure of our data.  Second, the price elasticity for the conditional demand elasticity 
is comparable in magnitude to our estimate of the local elasticity using the preference 
model.  However, there is a striking difference in the income elasticity estimates.  Under 
the DCC model, there is an insignificant income effect. By contrast, our estimates of the 
income elasticity using the preference function are close to unity.   
Comparisons of the local price elasticity measures (in Table 5) from our 
preference model compared to the conditional elasticity estimates with the DCC model 
indicate that they are quite consistent.  While a statistical test for the difference between 
these estimates is not possible, their relative proximity suggest, for practical purposes, 
                                                 
24 We were unable to locate estimates of the responsiveness of utility expenditures to the price of water do 
not appear to have been developed.  
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they would not imply differences in local responsiveness to small changes in price.  This 
is not surprising since the two models are describing “average” responsiveness.   
The important feature of our proposed method is the ability to recover the 
structural parameters required for evaluating large scale changes.  Indeed, with micro 
data and greater detail on swimming pools, landscape infrastructure and variables 
describing other large water using capital decisions we could relax the assumption that 
the share of expenditures on utilities varies on with income and expand the range of 
structural parameters estimated with the framework. 
 
VI. Summary and Implications 
This paper argues that the conventional approach for analyzing commodity 
demand in the presence of kinked budget constraints cannot evaluate the implications of 
large changes in the pricing structure for water.  Moreover, it relies on the assumption of 
a constant conditional demand function across different marginal price segments in an 
increasing block rate structure.  We proposed an alternative that uses a preference 
specification as the primitive in estimation.  It allows us to consider welfare changes to 
large scale changes in the price structure.  The data available for our application, while 
comparable to the most common information available for characterizing water demand, 
describes the “average” response rather than the individual household response.  
Aggregate data for all residential customers served by 43 water service providers in the 
Phoenix area are used to estimate our preference based model and a version of the DCC 
model.    
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An application to the “average” residential customer based on aggregate data is of 
interest because these data are what is readily available for most water demand 
applications.  To date, the DCC model has been exclusively associated with applications 
with access to extensive household level water consumption data as well as sufficient 
price variation to recover demand responsiveness.  When these data do not exist, policy 
analysts are forced to adapt existing (and often old estimates) to describe how 
household’s water demand responds to changes in the block rate pricing structure. 
Our strategy exploits the economic and demographic diversity of households 
along with GIS techniques to characterize the demographic and economic features of the 
spatially delineated service areas for the water providers included in our sample.  In 
addition, rather than derive an estimator that uses the preference function to predict the 
facet of the budget constraint selected and then the amount of the commodity demanded, 
we focus on developing instruments for the choice variables and estimating parameters of 
the separable sub-function of preferences.  With detailed micro records, our framework 
could be extended using the two error framework and logic comparable to Zabalza’s 
work to develop a maximum likelihood estimator. These are the types of estimates 
needed to address the challenge of designing price structures that encourage water 




Table 1: Summary of Price Schedules in the PAMA 
Range of Prices by Price Structure 
Schedule Providers  Service 
Charge 
(average) 
Block 1  Block 2  Block 3  Block 4 
Uniform 7 14.49  1.75-2.86       
Two 
Block 
            13  12.43  0-4.10  0.35-3.00       
Three 
Block 
            20  12.31  0-6.80  0.68-10.2  1.00-12.30    
Four 
Block 
3 13.41  0  1.26-1.68  1.59-2.54  2.04-3.05 
Average Block Width by Price Structure in gallons 
  Providers  Block  1  Block 2  Block 3 
Uniform  7          
Two 
Block 
13  7267       
Three 
Block 
20 6115  12335     
Four 
Block 
3 2333  6333  10000 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Socio-Demographic and Weather Variables 
Summary Statistics for Socio-demographic variables 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Mean Income 
(2000  dollars)  74932.56 41385.67 36938.75 213128.3 
Number 
Customers  22540.79 58141.49 20  365499 
Average 
Consumption 
(gallons)  13721.19 11705.32 2530.141 110690.5 
Percentage  Pools  0.2155752 0.1883112 0.0375906 0.8913924 
Mean House 
Value (2000 
dollars)  164898.2 111843.6 54761.38 539851.4 
Total Residential 
Lots  25235.86 75519.2  8.266092 486640.1 
Total Rental Units  7121.07  28172.17  0.0333717  183255.1 
Summary of Weather Variables 




392.4167 363.2004 0  1005 
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Table 4:  Estimates of Utilities Sub-function
a 
Parameter















































a The number in parentheses are the z-statistics for the null hypothesis of no association.  The 
estimates were derived with non-linear least squares, replacing expenditures net of water and water demand 
with instruments. 
b ZTemp is cooling degree days that roughly corresponds to the effects of temperature on the growth 
of grasses, Zno cust is the number of customers in the service provider area, qpools is the percentage of 
residential lots with pools in the service provider area, θsummer and θwinter are dummy variables for months in 





Table 5: Estimated Price and "Income" Elasticities 
A. Computed elasticities at the mean value of water and utility expenditures
a 


























Income  0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 
 
B. Computed elasticities for each provider – summary for summer months
b 
Own price (absolute magnitude) 
Mean .404  .158 
Median .398  .154 
Min .341  .103 
Max .365  .302 
Utility Expenditure 
Mean 1.017  1.032 
Median 1.013  1.014 
Min 1.004  1.004 
Max 1.073  1.028 
a The number in parentheses are the z-statistics for the null hypothesis of no association.   
bThe first column corresponds to estimates using the model with instruments based on economic 
and demographic characteristics of each provider service area.  The second column uses the provider fixed 































































aThe number in parentheses is the asymptotic t-statistic 
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